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ABSTRACT  
 
Over the past decade, most emerging and transition economies are experiencing fast growth, 
which is above the world average, and a consistent institutional change. The aim of this paper is 
twofold. First of all, a cross-country analysis of a group of emerging and transition economies in the 
period 1999-2005 will be carried out in order to understand what determines such growth among 
these countries. Secondly, a comparative analysis will be carried out. The countries will be 
classified according to their socio-economic models and institutional variables. Countries will be 
classified by taking their financial structures and ownership control over firms into consideration 
(Levine and Kunt, 1999; La Porta et. al., 1999), and we will investigate whether institutions and the 
type of socio-economic model may have an impact on growth. 
The central hypothesis of the paper is that explaining economic growth is a complex issue 
which needs positive interaction of several socio-economic and institutional factors. My analysis 
suggests that countries can grow with their own “style of capitalism” and economic model, and the 
determinants of economic growth seem to be the ability of each country to associate appropriate 
governance and institutions with education level, export activity and non-income dimensions of 
human development (life expectancy growth and infant mortality reduction). In fact, countries 
which experienced an increase in non-income dimensions of human development during 1970-
2000, as a consequence of appropriate institutions, have sustained economic growth.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most challenging themes for economists is to explain “how countries become rich”. 
Adam Smith observed that some nations are richer even if not all the individuals in that society 
work whereas other nations are extremely poor, even if all the individuals work. He attributed most 
of the output differences among countries to better organization and labour division. Recently, there 
has been burgeoning literature in this field but theories and empirical analyses about economic 
growth consistently diverge.  
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, a cross-country analysis of a group of emerging and 
transition economies during the years 1999-2005 will be carried out. This is a group of 42 countries 
which includes almost all the emerging economies as defined by the IMF. These countries 
experienced fast growth which was above the world average in the past decade and a consistent 
institutional change. Moreover, Spain and Ireland are included in this analysis because they can be 
considered reference points for emerged economies. The first research question is what determines 
such growth among those 44 countries. 
 
Secondly, a comparative analysis will be carried out. The 44 countries will be classified according 
to their socio-economic models and institutional variables. Countries will be classified by taking 
their financial structures and ownership control of firms into consideration (Levine and Kunt, 1999; 
La Porta et. al., 1999). A first mapping of countries includes:  
1. competitive capitalist countries 
2. corporative capitalist countries 
3. dirigiste economies 
4. socialist markets. 
I will investigate whether institutions, defined in general as “rule of the game” (North, 1990) have, 
in some way, an impact on growth and if the type of socio-economic model is one of the 
determinants of growth. 
 
The central hypothesis of the paper is that explaining economic growth is a complex problem which 
needs positive interaction of several socio-economic and institutional factors. The economic growth 
literature abounds with papers explaining growth on the basis of four or five factors, often taken 
singularly, such as human capital (Lucas, 1993; Barro, 1998; Young, 1995; Goldin and Lawrence, 
2001), technology (Kuznets, 1966; Landes, 1969; Mokyr, 1990), natural resources (Shaban, 1987; 
Walker and Ryan, 1990), trade (Lockwood, 1954; Pomeranz, 2000; Galor and Mountford, 2003) 
and population density (Das Gupta, 1994). In parallel, “market-friendly” economic reforms are 
advocated as necessary conditions for economic growth. However, such economic reforms in Less 
Developed Countries (LDC) have failed to deliver  the promised economic growth during the 
1980s-1990s (Easterly, 2001).  
 
Recently, more and more economists have started to take into account the role of institutions for 
economic growth (North, 1990; Jones 1981; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Olson et al. 1998; Nugent 
and Lin, 1995; Acemouglu et al., 2001; etc). In parallel, an increasing literature championed by the 
United Nation of Development Program (UNDP) has been critical of economic growth which does 
not take into account human development indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, 
literacy, etc. The main problem with all this literature is the lack of interaction between some 
relevant socio-economic factors of growth and well-captured institutions. On the contrary, in our 
paper we maintain that countries which experienced an increase in non-income dimensions of 
human development during 1970-2000 as a consequence of appropriate institutions, will have 
sustained economic growth. Secondary school net enrolment and Export are included in the cross-
country analysis as independent variables.  
 
We found that the socio-economic model does not seem to be a determinant of growth and countries 
can grow with their own “style of capitalism” and economic model. The determinants of economic 
growth seem to be the ability of each country to associate appropriate governance and institutions 
with education level, export activity and non-income dimensions of human development (life 
expectancy growth and infant mortality reduction).  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: in section 2 we define emerging economies and the 
countries that were part of our sample; in section 3, we present briefly the relevant literature on 
economic growth; in section 4 we describe our variables, Human Capital, Openness, Education, 
HDI and Institutions; in section 5 we present our model and the first results of a cross-section 
analysis and in section 6, an institutional analysis is proposed and, on the basis of that, we control 
for the type of socio-economic model; some final remarks will conclude the paper.  
 
 
 
 
2. Emerging economies: a mishmash of countries 
 
The term “emerging economy” (EE) was coined in 1981 by Antoine Van Agtmael of the World 
Bank, and refers to a country that is “emerging” from under-development, and started a path of 
considerable economic growth, together with a process of reforms.2 Yet those countries are from 
low-to-middle per capita income economies. They are approximately 80% of the global population 
and they represent about 20% of the world's economies. Emerging economies are small-, medium- 
and large- sized, and, in general, they appear on the global scene because they are becoming more 
open economies. China and Tunisia, for instance, are part of the category of emerging economies 
because they have been experiencing high economic growth and a process of reforms over the past 
decade.  Moreover, they opened their markets to the global economy.  
 
In this sense, emerging economies can also be considered transitional economies because they are 
experiencing a structural and institutional change, moving from closed economies to open 
economies. Following this definition, some European countries, such as Spain and Ireland, could 
have been considered emerging economies in the 1980s and 1990s when they experienced fast 
growth and structural change. For this reason, we include them in our analysis as reference 
countries for currently emerging economies.    
 
Along with this kind of EE, another category can certainly be added, that of the former communist 
countries which started the transition from planned economy towards market economy, i.e., Soviet 
Union Republics (FSUR) and Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC). However, not all of 
them are part of our analysis. We selected a sample of countries which are generally experiencing 
fast growth together with a program of reforms. Some countries, such as Uzbekistan, Belarus and 
Turkmenistan did not start a true transition process and they are still planned economies. Other 
countries, such as Armenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and other Countries of the Independent 
Confederation (CIS) did not experience a process of fast growth and, for this reason, are not 
included in our analysis.  
 
On the contrary, 44 countries are part of our sample: 13 former communist countries: Russia, 
Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak, Estonia, Lithuania, Croatia, Albania, Latvia, 
Bulgaria and Romania; 12 Asian countries: China and Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
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 Agtmael A., The Emerging Markets Century: How A New Breed of World-Class Companies is Overtaking the World, 
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Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Pakistan; 9 Latin American 
countries: Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia, 1 
South-east European country, Turkey; 2 Middle Eastern countries: Saudi Arabia and Israel; 5 
African countries: South Africa, Botswana, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia and 2 old European Union 
member states, Spain and Ireland. 
 
Average economic growth in the whole sample, in the period 1999-2005, was 4.3%, above the 
world average growth of 4.1% (IMF, World Economic outlook, 2006). Some countries such as 
Venezuela, Turkey, Pakistan and Argentina, had an average growth during 1999-2005 which was 
lower because of crises and slumps between 1999-2001. Nevertheless, in the last 3-4 years, these 
four countries also experienced an economic growth rate which was far above the world average.   
 
 
3. Explaining economic growth: a brief review  
 
As we stated above, explaining economic growth is a complex problem because several factors can 
contribute to growth process. All the theoretical predictions which assume that a single specific 
factor makes some countries richer than others do not find consistent empirical confirmation. Many 
exceptions, for instance, can be raised against the idea that human capital is the only factor which is 
important for growth: some countries such as Poland, Russia, South Korea have education levels 
which are very close to those in the richest economies yet their GDP per capita is much lower. 
Another problem with human capital is the possibility of reverse causality between growth and 
education and it is important to understand which one comes first and which one causes what. 
Human capital is definitely an important factor for economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995; Barro, 1998) but it has also been seen that differences in human capital can explain no more 
that one-fifth of the differences in living standards (Olson, 1996). 
 
A similar argument can be put forward with regard to the relation between technology and growth. 
Richer countries can afford high levels of R&D expenditure and they can enjoy positive returns and 
spillover from that. Investment in technology is definitely correlated, both theoretically and 
empirically, with economic growth but the root of the problem seems to be how countries can 
afford high levels of investment in technology and, consecutively, how some nations have more 
advanced technology than others (Yeager, 2004).  
 
Another factor which is often considered very important for economic growth is natural resources 
(Shaban, 1987; Walker and Ryan, 1990). United States, Norway, Germany and other richer 
countries possess abundant natural resources such as oil, cool, land, etc. However, many other 
better or equally endowed countries such as Russia, Brazil, Nigeria, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia etc. 
are not as rich while other poorer endowed countries such as Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong  
are much richer. 
 
The same exceptions can be found when considering trade and population density. In the first case, 
together with the success of some export led countries such as Ireland and the “Asian Tigers”, the 
history of economies also records successfully cases of inward-oriented countries such as France 
and other old European Member States after the IIWW. Even the Asian tigers, before entering the 
global economy, created a strong “infant industry” and promoted import-substitutions policies. 
From a theoretical point of view, similar contradictions can be traced between some economists 
who support the idea of a strong correlation between trade and growth (Bhagwati, 2004, Galor and 
Mountford, 2003) and others who minimize the impact of trade on growth (Krevise 2000) arguing 
that in some cases negative effects such as inequality, wage discrimination and skilled and unskilled 
inequality seem to prevail (Nayyar, 2000). With regard to population density, today we cannot say 
that poverty is always associated with high density as some economists, following Malthusian 
predictions, initially believed. Switzerland, Germany (and in particular the former West Germany) 
and newly industrialized Asian countries have a high population density and this was not an 
obstacle to their economic development. In contrast, many Latin American countries such as Brazil 
and Mexico have a low population density but this did not bring development. 
 
Hence, it seems that a comparative analysis reveals many problems and many controversial aspects 
related to development. Economic growth does not seem to be associated with one single particular 
factor which is able to bring about development. No single mentioned factor is able to explain 
economic differences between countries. Moreover, the failure of Washington Consensus during 
1990s in several countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Russia, etc. (Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik, 2004) 
also showed that there is no single economic policy receipt suitable for all countries while 
interaction between variables, national institutions and path dependency can explain much more the 
recent economic success of many countries in Asia or the economic boom of some European 
countries after the Second World War (Rodrik, 1999).    
 
In former communist transitional economies, the transformation from plan to market was mainly 
perceived by economists and policy makers as a combination of Liberalization, Privatization and 
Stabilization (LPS). This receipt, associated with democratization, brought about moderate success 
in some countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary while in other countries, where LPS 
receipt was less associated with democratization,  such as Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and many 
other former Soviet Republics, it brought about failures and less income than prior transition. On 
the contrary, in China and a few other emerging economies where heterodox policies were 
implemented, there was no consensus on the above mentioned LPS receipt yet China economic 
growth is defined as “phenomenal” and economic success is real. China’s success occurred without 
complete liberalization, without privatization and without democratization (Qian 2003). In 1988, 
China’s GDP was half of Russia’s, in 1998 Russia’s GDP was half of China’s. Markets incentives 
occurred without liberalization and secure private property rights. 
 
China was poor, overpopulated, short of human capital and natural resources and was constrained 
by an ideology which was hostile towards markets. Nevertheless, GDP growth took place and was, 
under such initial conditions, really surprising (Qian, 2003). GDP in terms of “Purchasing Power 
Parity” (PPP) in China is about to reach and/or to overcame the ones of the largest European 
economies (Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany).  
 
4. The determinant of economic growth: interaction between selected variables 
 
As the review of the literature above suggests, there does not seem to be a single receipt with one 
variable that is able to explain economic growth. On the contrary, empirical evidence in developed 
capitalist economies and also in the recently emerged economies such as Ireland and Spain, the 
reference countries in our sample, shows that economic receipt was very different among capitalist 
countries. Moreover, a consistent part of economic growth comes from a residual which is not 
explained by traditional variables such as capital and labour. This residual, which is generally 
associated with technological progress, can be explained by better endowment of some variables 
such as institutions, infrastructures, social capital, etc. (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Olson et al., 1998; 
Jones and Hall, 1999).      
 
Therefore, in order to explain economic growth, our analysis focuses on the interaction between 
some socio-economic factors and institutional indicators. Only when “institutions”, which provide 
the proper governance, give the right incentives to economic agents, a positive interaction with 
other socio-economic variables will foster economic growth. Each society can have their own 
formal and informal rules but what it is important is that they provide a consistent institutional 
framework for a good business environment, reduce uncertainty, and implement effectively 
appropriate institutions and policies. Below we will present the relevant factors which can interact 
positively with each other in order to create economic growth. 
 
4.1 Human Capital 
 
Starting from endogenous growth models, more and more economists included schooling in their 
growth model. Romer (1986), following seminal works by Young (1928), Kaldor (1957) and Arrow 
(1962), imputed increasing returns to scale to knowledge. An improvement in the skills of workers 
increases, ceteris paribus, the final outcome simply because skilled workers are more productive. 
Knowledge is strictly connected with school and education. Lucas (1988) directly associated the 
human capital with “learning by schooling” and “learning by doing”, allowing human capital to 
become reproducible. Physical capital integrated by this definition of human capital is part of a 
cumulative and reproducible process which avoids decreasing return to scale. Empirically, this 
model was followed among others by Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
and Barro (1998) who showed that convergence between countries is conditional to improvements 
over time in secondary school enrolment. At the same time, neoclassical economists argue that 
human capital only accounts for a fraction of cross-country income differences (Hendricks 2002). 
Moreover, reverse causality, according to which growth causes schooling, seems to be, in their 
cross-country analysis, more important (Bils and Klenow, 2000). In our model, human capital, 
expressed by the variable “secondary school net enrolment” as an average between 2000-05, 
contributes to economic growth only when it is associated with appropriate governance, captured by 
political stability and government effectiveness. Of course, policies and incentives, even in 
politically stable countries with strong governments could be biased. However, political stability 
and government effectiveness would at least offer a consistent and secure institutional framework 
which would allow economic agents, both workers and firms, to accumulate knowledge and capital 
(Jones and Hall, 1999). Economic agents would know that they could get benefits from that better 
than in a country where political instability and government ineffectiveness prevail. 
  
4.2 Openness 
 
Lewis (1980), and with him many economists such as Lucas (1993) and Baghwati (2004), believed 
that trade is the engine of economic growth. Nevertheless, the experience of globalization, so far, 
has shown that performance of opened economies can vary consistently. The hypothesis that we are 
supporting in the paper is that openness per se, although it is one of the indicators of 
competitiveness, it is not an engine of economic growth. Openness (defined as import and export as 
GDP percentage) and integration in the world economy should be accompanied by institutions and 
state strategies which support internal cohesion and maintain external competitive advantages. 
According to Rodrik (1999), the best performing countries are the ones that are integrated in the 
world economy with appropriate institutions which are able to support the impact of globalization 
on domestic market and social domestic issues. Countries with poor political institutions, weak 
conflict management institutions and strong social cleavages suffer the external shocks and do not 
perform well in the world economy.  
 
The world market  is a source of disruption and upheaval as much as it is an opportunity for profit 
and economic growth. Without the complementary institutions at home – in the areas of 
governance, judiciary, civil liberties, social insurance, and education – one gets too much of the 
former and too little of the later. The weakness of the domestic institutions of conflict management 
was the Achilles’ heel of the development strategy pursued in Latin America, the Middle East, and 
elsewhere, and this is what made countries in these regions so susceptible to the external shocks of 
the 1970s (Rodrik, 1999 p.96). 
 
In Lucas (1993), international trade contributes to stimulate economic growth through a process of 
structural change and capital accumulation. As in the case of Ireland, where according to Walsh  
and Whelan (1999) a structural change had already taken place during the 1970s and created 
conditions which allowed the Irish economy to grow considerably in the 1990s and later in the 
2000s.3 Capital accumulation is determined by a “learning by doing” and a “learning by schooling” 
in a process of knowledge and innovation spillover. A country which protects their goods from 
international competition by raising tariffs on goods made with intensive skilled work will have as 
an effect an increase, at home, in the price of goods which use intensive skilled work. Skilled 
workers’ wages will increase and R&D will be more expensive. Consecutively investments in R&D 
will decrease and growth will be affected negatively. On the contrary, deleting tariffs on those 
goods will cause a reduction in the price of goods which use intensive skilled work. R&D will cost 
less and investments in R&D will increase with positive effects on growth (Lucas, 1993). Policies 
should therefore address such problems and should create conditions for effective and substantial 
R&D investments. 
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 Similar conditions which are however less marked, took place in Spain which together with Ireland is a reference 
country in our sample.   
In our model, openness (expressed by the variable “Export” in $US during 2000-05) to world 
economy is not a condition of economic growth. Following Rodrik’s approach, policies and 
institutions together with openness and human capital interact positively and can create better 
conditions for sustainable economic growth. Institutions give the right incentive for knowledge to 
be accumulated and capital to be invested. This allows firms to be more competitive and export 
more leading to higher economic growth.   
 
4.3 Human Development 
 
The idea that the GDP is an absolute and reliable measure of development has been widely 
criticized by development economists (Morris, 1979; Sen, 1985; Noorbakhsh, 1996). A great deal 
of empirical evidence shows that, both in developing and in developed economies, some countries 
have relatively high GDP per capita but very low indicators of development such as literacy, access 
to drinking water, rate of infant mortality, life expectancy, education, etc. This is partly due to the 
fact that wealth is unequally distributed. Vice versa, there are cases of relatively low GDP per capita 
and high indicators of development in countries where income is more equally distributed (Ray 
1998).4 Human development, which is considered to be a process which allows for an environment 
where people enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP, 1990), is a better measure of well-
being. Human development is measured using the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).5  
 
The core idea which is maintained in this paper is that countries that experienced an increase in 
human development levels will have sustained economic growth. Investments in Human 
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 For instance, Guatemala has a GDP per capita that is higher than Sri Lanka but inequality is much higher in 
Guatemala. Development indicators are much better in Sri Lanka than in Guatemala. Life expectancy (years): 72 
compared with 65; infant mortality rate (per 1000): 18 compared with 48; access to safe water (% of pop.): 60 compared 
with 62; adult literacy rate (%): 89 compared with 54 (UNDP, 1995). Examples like this are numerous and non-perfect 
correspondence between GDP and development indicators can be observed even in industrialized countries where there 
are more resources to distribute. For instance, Ireland has the highest GDP per capita after Luxemburg yet its non-
income dimension indicators i.e., education and life expectancy are lower than Italy or Portugal (UNDP 2006). Saudi 
Arabia has a GDP per capita which is higher than many transition economies such as Poland Czech Republic, Hungary 
etc, but its non-income dimension indicators are lower. USA has an income per capita which is much higher than most 
of the countries in the world, yet life expectancy of black American citizens is lower than in China or in the Indian State 
of Kerala. As a result of all these contradictions and exceptions, the UNDP taxation of Human Development Indexes 
and GDP rank is not at all coincident (UNDP, 1999). 
5
 The UNDP Human Development Index is a composite index, ranking between 0-1. It is the combination of two non-
income dimensions of people’s lives and one income dimension. The first one is life expectancy at birth which also 
reflects infant mortality. The second one is educational attainment which is a combination of primary, secondary and 
tertiary educational level and adult literacy rate. The third element is an adjusted GDP index which reflects income per 
capita measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at US$ (UNDP, 1990).  
 
Development increase both aggregate demand and effective quality of life. A better quality of life 
will generate a better and more skilled labour forces, with positive effects on economic growth, as 
Barro (1998) showed using improvements in life expectancy from 1960s to 1990s as an explanatory 
variable in growth regression. We will show that countries which invested during 1970-2000 in 
non-income dimensions of human development are emerging today (1999-2005) as fast growing 
economies. However, non-income dimensions of human development are associated with 
institutional improvements and competitiveness. In other words, human development, together with 
appropriate institutions and competitiveness of markets, underlined by export ability and human 
capital, determine economic growth.  
 
4.4 Institutions 
 
Economic researches showed that institutions and good governance, in some ways, matter in 
economic organization and rising productivity (i.e., Knack and Keefer, 1994; Olson et al 1998; 
Jones and Hall 1999; Acemouglu et. al., 2001; etc). Institutions are in general defined as “the rules 
of the game”. A more sophisticate definition of institutions is “a set of social rules that structure 
social interactions” (Knight 1992, p. 2). If we consider this definition of institutions, then the 
explanation of development should be consistent with that of Kuznets (1965, p. 30): “the 
transformation of an underdeveloped in to a developed country is not merely the mechanical 
addition of a stock of physical capital: it is a thoroughgoing revolution in the patterns of life and a 
cardinal change in the relative powers and position of various groups in the population”. 
Consequently, in order to change institutions, the prevalent social rules need to be changed. In 
emerging economies, informal economic institutions (i.e. uncodified and prevalent social rules6) can 
be very resistant towards change and inertia may occur. This is one of the most important problems 
which inhibit development. Institutional policies and an active State role are therefore needed in 
order to favour cultural change and foster development.  
 
To characterize institutions and institutional reforms is a very difficult task and institutional 
economists are well aware of this. Recently, Bardhan (2005) suggested that some non-income 
dimensions of development are better explained by a particular institutional index such as 
participatory rights and democratic accountability than property right institutions, while according 
to Rodrik and Rigobon (2005), who explain income gaps among countries, democracy and the rule 
of law are both good for economic performance.  
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 Cf. Hodgson (2006). 
Since 1996 the World Bank has regularly published governance indicators which focus on political 
institutions and informal institutions.7 We will use these indicators as independent extra-economic 
variables interacting with other economic variables such as openness and education in order to 
observe their relation with economic growth. There are two variables which seem have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on our cross-country section, Government Effectiveness and 
Political Stability. This result confirms that countries which enjoyed relatively high political 
stability and governments which were able to give effectiveness to appropriate rules and institutions 
had better performance in terms of GDP. Another variable, such as Voice and Accountability, 
seems to be important for performance in terms of HDI. Finally, Control of Corruption, Regulatory 
Quality and Rule of Law which are also taken into consideration, do not seem statistically 
significant for the GDP or HDI.  
 
The point is that if Government is ineffective or the State is politically unstable, the formal 
economic institutions are weaker and informal institutions and processes of spontaneous forces 
prevail. This informal institutionalization may also be parastatal or illegal. Examples include the 
mafia, organized crime, corrupt bureaucracy and an informal economic network among agents, 
lobbies, etc. These forces fill the vacuum power. These kinds of informal institutions will generate 
an informal and illegal economy, underdevelopment forces such as inequality and poverty will 
prevail and human development will be lowered. Moreover, economic relations will be weakened 
and transaction costs will increase, thus negatively affecting economic growth.  
 
Recently the relationship institutions economic growth has been increasingly investigated both 
from a theoretical and empirical point of view (e.g., North and Thomas, 1981; Jones 1981; Knack 
and Keefer, 1995; Rodrik 1999). Olson et al. (1998) show that better governance and quality of 
institutions are the main sources of economic growth and determine the differences between the 
output of the various countries. Along the same lines, Jones and Hall (1999) find that “Social 
Infrastructure” and governmental policies explain the different levels among countries of the 
residual productivity, which in turn, is on the basis of the GDP level of the countries. However, 
very often the main problem with this analysis is a reliable estimate of the impact of institutions on 
economic performance. Usually, rich countries have better institutions. The difficulty is to obtain an 
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 World Bank indicators, elaborated by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) reflect the statistical compilation of 
responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental 
organizations, and international organizations. Indexes are estimated between -2,5 and +2,5. They concern five 
fundamental governance dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. 
instrumental and exogenous variable to compare with income. Acemouglu et. al., (2001) estimate in 
a cross country section that institutions, expressed instrumentally by settler mortality rates, have a 
significant effect on economic growth.   
 
In the model below, independent institutional variables will be regressed together with non-income 
dimension variables such as life expectancy and infant mortality, which to some extent, are indirect 
indicators of policies (cf. Easterly, 2001). The first results seem to suggest that only when 
institutions and policies interact with openness - represented by export capacity of countries - and 
with education – represented by the percentage of net enrolment in secondary education - the cross 
country section seem to yield consistent results.8   
 
5. The model 
 
In our model, institutions, measured by the World Bank governance indicators, play a crucial role.  
On the one hand, institutions, and voice and accountability and government effectiveness in 
particular explain Human Development. In fact, human development is based on Sen’s notion of 
“capability”, perceived in the sense of what people want and can choose (Sen 1985; Sen 1999). At 
the same time, choices are determined by institutions and perceived in the sense of policies that give 
opportunities to people, in other words, capabilities (Fadda, 2003). Increasing Human Development 
means increasing both aggregate demand and effective quality of life. This is on the basis of the 
first positive interaction between institutions and human development. A better quality of life, 
captured by life expectancy and infant mortality, will generate stronger and better labour forces, 
with a positive effect on economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, World Bank indicators and political stability and government effectiveness, in 
particular, provide an institutional framework which is useful for reducing uncertainty, ensuring 
property rights and  guaranteeing legality. This underlines a second positive interaction between 
institutions, human capital and openness. In other words, economic agents receive positive 
incentives to accumulate human capital (i.e., education), invest in R&D and therefore be more 
competitive in the world economy, with a positive effect on economic growth (Jones and Hall, 
1999). Both the first and the second interactions will generate high economic growth. Such a model, 
which is analysed in the cross country regression, is shown in the figure below: 
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  Net enrolment in secondary education can be a better indicator, in emerging countries, for skilled workers. 
Figure 1 
 
In the cross country analysis, we first regress human development index (2004) with institutional 
variables. The HDI is largely explained (R-squared 57%) by Voice and Accountability and 
Government Effectiveness (2000-2005). Other variables, such as rule of law, control of corruption 
and political stability do not seem to improve the regression and are therefore excluded. These 
results, which are consistent with Bardhan’s (2005), encourage institutional policies which give 
opportunities to people, allow for pluralism and provide a consistent institutional framework.   
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix 
                |   hdi_04     voice_ac    poli_st    gov._ef     rule_L     cont_of_cor 
      hdi_04   |   1.0000 
voice_accounta  |   0.6535     1.0000 
politi_stability   |   0.5924     0.5690     1.0000 
govern_effectiv  |   0.6883     0.5826     0.8197     1.0000 
 rule_of_Law  |   0.6332     0.5768     0.7834     0.9691       1.0000 
cont_of_corrup |   0.6449     0.5475     0.7347     0.9474       0.9587     1.0000 
Source: own elaboration, data in appendix 
 
Table 2. Dependent variable: HDI 2004 
Model: OLS  
Number of obs: 44 
 Coeff. Std. Err.      P>|t| 
Voice and Accountability 5.8669 1.933471      0.004 
Government effectiveness 8.0007 2.164681      0.001 
Constant 18.851 1.351734     0.000 
 
Prob > F =  0.0000; R-squared=  0.5703; Adj R-squared =  0.5493 
Source: own elaboration, data in appendix 
 
 
If China had the same level/quality of institutions as Ireland its HDI would be 25% more than its 
actual level. For Botswana, the HDI would be 68% higher and for Pakistan, it would be 82% higher. 
 
Better institutions are not only able to improve HDI. Better institutions, together with non-income 
dimensions of human development and openness, seem to explain most of the recent growth of 
Institutions 
Openness and 
Human capital  
 
Human 
development 
Economic growth 
emerging economies. In the second cross-section, we regress GDP growth (average 1999-2005) 
with infant mortality growth (1975-2000), Life expectancy growth (1970-2000), net enrolment in 
secondary schools (average 2000-05) and Export (average 2000-05). Export is both an indicator of 
competitiveness and policy. We observe that when institutions (i.e., political stability and 
government effectiveness) are included in the regression, the R-squared increases and the 
coefficients are statistically more significant. In other words, as interaction tests confirm, interaction 
between institutions with HD variables, education and openness increases economic performance, 
yet openness and education alone are no longer enough to explain economic growth. 
 
Table 3. Dependent variable: average rate of economic growth (1999-2005) 
Regressions with and without institutional variables: 
Political stability and government effectiveness (pos_gov_eff) 
Model: OLS 
Number of obs 43 
 I Reg. II Reg. 
 Coeff. Coeff. 
Reduction inf_mor70_00 
 
5.587.558 
(1.671927)* 
4.788.248 
(1.683564)* 
life_ex_70-00 
 
4.853.006 
(2.478007)** 
3.100.570 
(2.401662) 
pos_gov_eff 
 
.787604 
(.3979088)**  
export_000 
 
7.8209 
(3.0909)* 
9.0409 
(3.1409)* 
edu_2 
 
.0523425 
(.0221413)** 
.0692346 
(.0212003)* 
cons 
2.975.779 
(1.784233)*** 
1.382.173 
1.652258 
 
 
 
 
Prob > F=  0.0005 
R-squared=  0.4384 
Adj R-squared=  0.3625 
 
Prob > F =  0.0010 
R-squared =  0.3790 
Adj R-squared=  0.3136 
 
Significance level at 1%(*), 5% (**), 10%(***); Standard error in parenthesis 
Source: own elaboration , data in appendix 
 
The results of our cross-country analysis in Table 3 confirm that growth is a complex process. In 
general, growth seems to be associated with education and integration in the world economy 
mitigated by appropriate institutions expressed by Political Stability and Government Effectiveness 
and the improvement of human development. In particular, in our model, growth (Gro99.05) is a 
function of infant mortality reduction from 1970 to 2000 (IMR), life expectancy improvement from 
1970 to 2000 (LEI), Political stability and Government effectiveness (PS.GE - average indicator 
2000-2005), Export flow (EXP - average 2000-2005) and secondary net enrolment ratio in 
education (EDU2 - average 2000-2005): 
iEDUEXPGEPSLEIIMRGro εβββββα ++++++= 2.05.99 54321  
 
Interactions of the other variables with the institutional variable improve the quality of the 
regression. Nevertheless, the quality of institutions does not seem to be associated with any 
particular form of institutions. Political stability and government effectiveness are general concepts 
which are necessary for the economy to work. They provide a consistent institutional framework, 
allow economic agents to make right choices and manage and mitigate social conflicts. However, 
institutional forms and reform processes in each country can vary consistently and this does not 
affect economic performance. In fact, as we will show in the next paragraph, socio-economic 
models of these countries are very different. 
 
6. Socio-economic models and economic growth 
 
We classified countries on the basis of their socio-economic model. The classification is made 
following the approach of Choi Chonj Ju (2004) who takes control of firm ownership into 
consideration. However, this approach seems to lead to the same classification as that of Amoroso 
(2003), Jessop (2002), etc, who classify countries according to specific macroeconomic factors such 
as competition, welfare states, openness, etc. A classification which considers control of firms has 
the advantage of allowing a world-wide comparison among many countries. In some countries, 
firms are controlled by financial markets, in others the State has several control functions over firms 
and in others still, the control over firms is shared by State, banks, trade unions, etc. Following this 
classification we theoretically identify five types of models: 
1. competitive capitalist countries 
2. corporative capitalist countries 
3. dirigiste economies  
4. socialist markets.  
5. social democratic countries 
 
1. In a competitive capitalist country, financial markets control and determine shareholder 
behaviour and this affects corporate governance and performance. Among advanced 
economies, this model is represented by the USA. This model as well as the others listed 
below, is not only characterized by the type of control over shareholders. Many other factors 
are included on the basis of the differences between the models listed such as percentage of 
public expenditure in health and education; Welfare States, democracy/pluralism; etc., 
which are indicated in the TABLE A1 in the Appendix. However, we feel that the control 
over shareholders synthesises the type of socio-economic model well. Countries in this 
group, whose benchmark is Ireland, are mainly from Europe and Latin America. In general, 
these are countries where the economic and cultural influence of the USA, which is the 
theoretical benchmark of the model, is stronger. 
2. In corporative capitalist countries the control and monitoring of shareholders is shared by 
several agents such as banks, financial markets, Government and employees. This type of 
socio-economic model, implemented in Germany and Japan, which are the theoretical 
benchmarks, especially after WWII, is characterized by a particular type of compromise 
between economic agents and organizations. Current benchmarks in the sample are the New 
Industrialized Countries, NIC, (Hong Kong/Taiwan/Korea S./Singapore). In some Asian 
countries, such as Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia, this compromise 
included a sort of family capitalism because of the stronger power, in those countries, of 
some families (Hirshmann, 1981). Countries in this group are mainly from Europe and Asia. 
These are countries where the influence of Germany and Japan is stronger (Wade, 1990).  
3. The third group is made up of Dirigiste capitalist countries where State control of the market 
and some assets in particular is quite consistent, in line with the French model – the 
theoretical benchmark. However, this is a very heterogeneous group of countries and 
references to France, in terms of cultural and economic influence, are not clear with the 
exception of Tunisia and Algeria whose influences could derive from the fact that they were 
former French colonies. India, which could represent, to some extent, the benchmark of the 
sample, has a sort of mixed model where State control of markets is quite strong. Russia, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela have a very odd type of socio-economic model which 
is difficult to include completely in the French model of dirigisme capitalism. The 
attachment to this model is made rather on the basis of the power and the control that single 
“State leaders” and/or particular “families” or “organization” seem to have over the 
economy. Israel, which is also in this group, is a very special case. Because of its history and 
cultural heritage, the type of socio-economic model seems to fit into this group better. 
However, economic and cultural influence from France is scarce. In a way, Israel could 
constitute a benchmark in itself. 
4. China and Vietnam represent “Socialist Markets” and seem to be the only two countries 
which embrace such a model. This represents an evolution and a result of a reform process 
which started firstly in China in 1978 and was intensified during the 1990s (Yeager, 2004). 
This transitional process transformed China and Vietnam from planned economies to 
“Socialist Market Economies”, characterized first by particular forms of property rights 
which allow: 1) both privates and State to invest, without complete liberalization, 
privatization and pluralism; 2) integration in the world economy, though quite modest; 3) 
government control and monitoring of domestic financial markets. 
5. Finally, the Social democratic model should also be listed, although we did not find any 
countries, among emerging economies, which could be closer to such a model. This model 
is characterized by the traditional compromise between Trade Unions and Industrial 
organizations (Jessop, 2002; Amoroso, 2003). The State guarantees that this compromise is 
respected. This compromise allows trade unions and employees to play a role in the 
economic organization and in the corporate decisions. The Social democratic model follows 
this scheme: 
Trade Unions and Markets  Shareholder  corporate performance  
Theoretical Benchmarks of this model among advanced economies are Scandinavian 
economies such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The fact that we did not find 
any countries among emerging economies that could be included in the Social democratic 
model underlines, in a sense, that Scandinavian countries are not very influential and able to 
“export” their model, although it worked well in their countries and produced very positive 
results in economic and social terms (Rodhes, 2000). 
 
The classification is made by considering proxies from financial structures among countries 
elaborated by Levine and Kunt (1999) and La Porta et. al., (1999).9 In particular, a high indicator of  
“Claims of deposit money bank on private sector/GDP” underlines strong bank activity in the 
economy. Germany which is the benchmark country for the corporative capitalist model has 0.94 as 
a value of this indicator. While a high indicator of “Claims of other Financial Institutions on private 
sector/GDP” underlines market control of the economy. The USA which is the benchmark country 
for the competitive capitalist model has 0.91 as a value of this indicator (Levine and Kunt, 1999). 
The proxy for the dirigiste capitalist model comes from the Public share in commercial banks, and 
France has the highest values, among advanced economies, for this indicator (0.74).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9
 The debate, in the field of finance about the relation between finance structures and economic growth is very 
important (see for instance Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Levine and Zervos, 1998). However, this topic remains outside 
our analysis.  
Table 4. Type of socio-economic models 
1) Competitive 
capitalism  
 
2) Corporative 
capitalism  
 
3) Dirigiste 
capitalism  
 
4) Socialist  
Markets  
Financial Markets 
⇓ 
 shareholder  
⇓ 
 corporate performance 
 
 
 
Theoretical 
Benchmark: USA. 
Actual Benchmark in 
the Sample: Ireland 
 
Banks, Families, 
Government, Trade 
Union 
⇓ 
Shareholder  
⇓ 
corporate performance 
 
Theoretical 
Benchmark: 
Germany/Japan. 
Actual Benchmark in 
the Sample: NIC 
State and 
 Financial Market  
⇓ 
Shareholder 
     ⇓  
corporate performance 
 
 
Theoretical 
Benchmark: France. 
Actual Benchmark in 
the Sample: India 
Government and 
Emerging Markets 
⇓ 
Shareholder 
⇓ 
corporate performance 
 
 
Theoretical and actual 
Benchmark: 
China/Vietnam 
1. Ireland 
2. Bulgaria 
3. Romania 
4. Estonia 
5. Poland 
6. Czech Republic 
7. Peru 
8. Mexico 
9. Argentina 
10. Bolivia 
11. Chile 
12. Botswana 
13. Albania 
14. Slovak  
15. South Africa 
16. Ecuador 
1. Hong Kong 
2. Taiwan 
3. Korea S. 
4. Singapore 
5. Indonesia 
6. Thailand 
7. Latvia 
8. Philippines 
9. Lithuania 
10. Malaysia 
11. Hungary 
12. Slovenia 
13. Croatia 
14. Spain 
1. India 
2. Saudi Arabia 
3. Tunisia 
4. Russia 
5. Pakistan 
6. Venezuela 
7. Egypt 
8. Algeria 
9. Turkey 
10. Brazil  
11. Israel 
12. Colombia 
1. China 
2. Vietnam 
Average GDP growth 
1999-2005 
3.99% 
Average GDP growth 
1999-2005 
4.91% 
Average GDP growth 
1999-2005 
3.35% 
Average GDP growth 
1999-2005 
7.93% 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Countries are then classified according to the closeness of their indicators to the benchmarks. This 
classification is consistent with the ones elaborated by La Porta et al., (1999) who consider different 
indicators of corporate ownership and financial structures such as State/Families/Financial 
Institutions/miscellaneous ownerships of firms. Finally, China and Vietnam are classified as 
Socialist Markets following the interpretation of Choi Chonj Ju (2004) and many others (i.e., 
Yeager, 2004; Qian, 2003; etc). This classification is more influenced by long-run strategies than 
particular policies implemented in a short period. Therefore, even if a country, such as India or 
Brazil or Turkey, implemented neoliberal policies during 1990s (De Long 2003; Easterly, 2001; 
Stalling and Peres 2000), there are not automatically classified in competitive capitalism, etc.  
 
When we control for the type of socio-economic model of the country by introducing a dummy 
variable for each of the 4 models above analysed, the results are not significant. First of all, the 
correlation matrix below shows a low correlation between the dummy, which represents the type of 
model, and the average rate of growth (1999-2005).10  
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
              | growth       pos_gov     exp_000     edu_2      inf_mort.     life_ex    dummy_mod 
 growth99_05  |   1.0000 
pos_gov_eff  |   0.3786      1.0000 
export_000  |   0.3810      0.2122      1.0000 
edu_2   |   0.3570      0.5963      0.1052      1.0000 
inf_mor70-00 |   0.1912      -0.2233     -0.1071     -0.2603     1.0000 
life_ex_70-00  |  -0.1365     -0.4418      0.0059     -0.4169      -0.3036        1.0000 
dummy_mod  |   0.1163      -0.3444      0.2708     -0.1201      0.0093         0.3945      1.0000 
Source: own elaboration, data in appendix 
 
Secondly, the regression modified with the dummy variable yields poor results. Hence, the type of 
socio-economic model does not have an impact on growth. This confirms our hypothesis according 
to which it is not the model per se which makes countries richer or poorer but the consistency of the 
institutional framework and the effectiveness of appropriate policies, expressed by the political 
stability and government effectiveness indicators, which, together with some policy indicators of 
human development as defined by Easterly (2001) and with some particular variables such as 
education and export, allow countries to growth. The regression table obtained when introducing 
the dummy variable capturing the type of socio-economic model is shown below. 
 
Table 6. Dependent variable: average rate of economic growth (1999-2005) 
Model: OLS 
Number of obs 43 
 Coeff. Std. Err. P>|t| 
edu_2 .0491868 .0229916 0.039 
life_ex_70-00 4.338.365 2.652464 0.111 
reduct_inf_mor70_00 5.440.347 1.705971 0.003 
pos_gov_eff .8657235 .4233926 0.048 
export_000 7.0909 3.3609 0.042 
dummy_model .1715333 .2949728 0.565 
_cons 2.883.224 1.807429 0.119 
Prob > F =  0.0011; R-squared =  0.4436; Adj R-squared =  0.3509 
Source: own elaboration, data in appendix 
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 Each country received a dummy between 1 and 4, according to the model with which they are associated. 
Competitive capitalism (1), Corporative capitalism (2), Dirigiste capitalism (3), Socialist Markets (4). 
On the contrary, as the correlation matrix below shows, the type of model seems to be more 
correlated with certain social indicators such as inequality (Gini index) and poverty (cf Table A4 in 
Appendix). On one hand, since the sign of the correlation is negative, we observe that the smaller 
the dummy variable (close to 1, the competitive capitalist model), the higher the inequality. On the 
other hand, the correlation with poverty is positive: the greater the dummy variable (close to 4, 
socialist markets) the higher the poverty level. Finally, as we expected, the correlation between HDI 
and inequality and poverty is negative. Countries with higher HDI have lower poverty levels and 
better distribution of resources.  
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix 
             |  poverty     gini           model          hdi           gdp 04 
     poverty  |   1.0000 
  gini_index  |   0.4257     1.0000 
       model  |   0.1009      -0.0106     1.0000 
     hdi_‘03  |  -0.4108     -0.2937      -0.2218      1.0000 
gdp_ppp_04  |   0.0194      0.0332       0.1657        -0.0021    1.0000 
 
Source: own elaboration, data in appendix 
 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
In this paper we analysed, through a cross-country analysis, the determinants of economic growth 
among emerging economies. We found out that both human capital and export capacity are 
important for economic growth. However, these socio-economic variables increase their 
explanatory power when associated with two non-income dimensions of development which are 
also policy indicators (i.e., infant mortality reduction and life expectancy growth between 1970-
2000) and with good governance, expressed by two World Bank indicators such as Government 
effectiveness and Political Stability. We showed that interaction between these variables explained 
growth to a greater extent. In other words, socio-economic variables cause growth when extra-
economic institutional variables are able to provide appropriate incentives and security for 
economic agents to accumulate knowledge and capital. 
 
On the other hand, Voice and Accountability, together with Government Effectiveness seem to 
explain the HDI better. Indeed, pluralism and State interventism in a non-income dimension such as 
health public expenditure and education public expenditure would generate more opportunities for 
people and better capabilities. Increasing human development means increasing both the effective 
quality of life and aggregate demand with positive effects on labour forces and economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, we found out that the type of socio-economic model (i.e., competitive capitalism, 
corporative capitalism, dirigiste capitalism and socialist markets) does not have an impact on 
growth. Emerging economies adopted very different socio-economic models and growth occurred 
independently, as a cross-country analysis with dummy variables controlling for the type of socio-
economic model confirmed. 
APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1 Type of Economy – main institutional dimensions 
Countries 
 
Socio-
economic 
model * 
% of Public 
expenditure on 
GDP ( 1999-04) 
Integration in the global 
economy  (openness 
1999-04 exp+imp  
as % of GDP) 
Competitiveness (as % 
export on GDP 2000-
04) 
Pluralism -2.5/+2.5 
(as Voice and 
accountability 
2000-05) 
Ireland  13 167 80 1.36 
Argentina  17 31 25 0.35 
Bolivia  19 46 31 0.05 
Bulgaria  30 113 58 0.54 
Chile  18 65 36 0.94 
Czech Rep. 31 129 72 0.96 
Mexico  13 60 30 0.26 
Peru  17 34 21 0.03 
Poland  17 65 39 1.09 
Romania  15 74 37 0.39 
Albania  19 14.2 21 -0.04 
Botswana  29 6.4 40 0.73 
Ecuador  21 12.8 27 -0.13 
Estonia  31 14 78 1.00 
Slovak 26 10.4 77 0.97 
South Africa 
1 
Competitive 
Capitalism 
24 28.6 27 0.83 
Taiwan  12 9 5 0.85 
Korea S. 11 12.4 44 0.70 
Hong Kong  6 304 193 0.1 
Singapore  9 14.5 10 -0.05 
Slovenia  22 114 60 1.06 
Spain  17 57 26 1.11 
Thailand  16 121 71 0.2 
Lithuania  28 10.4 54 0.94 
Latvia  31 7.5 44 0.90 
Egypt  10 45 29 -1.01 
Hungary  28 137 64 1.11 
Indonesia  18 67 31 -0.43 
Philippines  15 102 52 0.12 
Malaysia  18 216 121 -0.36 
Croatia  
2 
Corporative 
capitalism 
28 5.5 47 0.44 
India  36 28 19 0.33 
Brazil  22 26 18 0.37 
Algeria  21 4.9 40 -1.05 
Turkey  16 57 29 -0.32 
Venezuela  17 45 36 -0.43 
Russia  26 63 35 -0.65 
Saudi Arabia 28 65 53 -1.52 
Tunisia  14 94 45 -0.97 
Pakistan  18 30 16 -1.28 
Israel  25 75 44 0.63 
Colombia  
3 
Dirigist 
economies 
28 41 21 -0.47 
China  29 46 34 -1.55 
Viet Nam  
4  Socialist 
markets 15 114 66 -1.54 
Sources: first column: own elaboration; second and third column: Heston A., Summers R., Aten B., (2006), Penn World 
Tables 6.1; fourth columns: UNCDAT, 2006; fifth column: Kaufmann et. al., 2006. Asian corporative economies have very 
low public expenditure in comparison with other. However, this would not be enough to justify their involvement in the 
competitive capitalist model (Hirschman, 1981; Wade, 1990).  
TABLE A.2 Relevant variables for growth (OLS model) 
 
Government 
effectiveness and 
Political Stability 
2000-05 
(-2.5/+2.5) 
Export (2000-05) 
thousand of $ 
Education:  
secondary net 
enrolment ratio 
2000-05* 
 
Life 
Expectancy 
growth  
1970-00 
 
Infant 
mortality 
reduction  
1970-00 
 
GDP growth 
1999-05 (%) 
(dependent 
variable) 
 
Argentina -0.18 28510101 79 10 -81 1.1 
Bolivia -0.48 1617243 74 36 -63 2.5 
Brazil -0.08 68390667 76 17 -66 2.3 
Bulgaria 0.13 6630929 88 01 -57 4.6 
Chile 0.95 21070827 80 24 -90 3.6 
China -0.03 3.74E+08 78 14 -69 9.0 
Hong Kong 1.14 2.18E+08 74 13 -69 5.1 
Colombia -1.25 13435841 55 16 -74 2.3 
Czech Republic 0.76 43086297 90 09 -81 3.3 
Egypt -0.42 4913327 81 35 -83 4.3 
Hungary 0.82 33808683 91 06 -81 4.4 
India -0.57 51264080 77 26 -51 6.3 
Indonesia -1.20 60228238 64 37 -71 4.3 
Ireland 1.38 89017840 87 10 -75 6.5 
Israel -0.28 32076673 89 11 -79 2.8 
Malaysia 0.51 1.02E+08 76 16 -78 5.4 
Mexico -0.05 1.63E+08 64 21 -71 2.8 
Pakistan -1.07 10884293 59 21 -33 1.7 
Peru -0.66 8473265 69 25 -79 3.5 
Philippines -0.53 35416858 61 21 -54 4.5 
Poland 0.53 47047873 90 4 -78 3.4 
Romania -0.07 15346125 81 3 -63 4.2 
Russia -0.66 1.24E+08 95 0 -34 6.7 
Saudi Arabia -0.25 71612992 52 33 -82 3.5 
Slovenia 0.96 11348061 93 09 -84 3.8 
Spain 0.91 1.28E+08 97 10 -89 3.6 
Thailand 0.08 71410257 67 15 -76 4.9 
Tunisia 0.42 7274470 67 30 -84 4.7 
Turkey -0.52 40990953 59 21 -81 0.3 
Venezuela -1.00 28642994 60 11 -66 1.7 
Viet Nam 0.04 15406011 85 40 -71 6.9 
Albania -0.47 384470.01 77 9 -78 5.56 
Algeria -0.53 23339337 67 31 -76 3.55 
Botswana 0.81 2743227.9 54 0 -15 6.03 
Croatia 0.28 5641038.2 87 07 -82 3.55 
Ecuador -0.92 5631091.2 50 28 -74 4.15 
Estonia 0.98 4668673.8 88 1 -71 6.06 
Korea S. 0.90 186565961 87 24 -88 5.29 
Latvia 0.61 2262015.3 88 1 -52 7.04 
Lithuania 0.69 6066402.3 94 1 -65 6.44 
Singapore 2.28 141422468 90 13 -86 6.13 
Slovak Republic 0.60 17712777 88 6 -76 3.36 
South Africa 0.65 29781846 66 0 -46 3.13 
Taiwan 1.15 145184607 88 na Na 4.33 
Notes: * data of China, India and Vietnam refer to gross  secondary school enrolment ratio 2000-05, (UNICEF, 2005 )  
Source: first column: Kaufmann et. al., 2006; second and third column: UNCDAT, 2006; fourth and fifth column: 
UNDP, 2006; sixth column: Word Economic Outlook, 2006. Venezuela, Turkey, Pakistan and Argentina have relatively 
lower GDP growth due crises between 1999-2001. Nevertheless, also these four countries, in the last 3-4 years, 
experienced an economic growth rate above the world average.      
TABLE A.3 Main economic strategies for growth11 
Source: first and second column: Kaufmann et. al., 2006; third, fourth and fifth column: UNDP, 2006.    
 
Government 
effectiveness 2000-05  
(-2.5/+2.5) 
Polit. stability 
2000-05  
(-2.5/+2.5) 
R&D as 
%GDP 2004 
 
 Health Public  
Expend. as %  
of GDP 2003 
Edu. Public  
Expend. as %  
of GDP 2003 
Argentina -0.07 -0.30 0.4 4.3 4.2 
Bolivia -0.35 -0.60 0.3 4.3 6.4 
Brazil -0.13 -0.04 1 3.4 4.1 
Bulgaria 0.03 0.22 0.5 4.1 4.2 
Chile 1.09 0.82 0.6 3 3.7 
China 0.08 -0.14 1.3 2 2.2 
Hong Kong 1.22 1.05 0.6 2.8 4.7 
Colombia -0.51 -1.99 0.2 6.4 4.9 
Czech Repub 0.75 0.77 1.6 6.8 4.6 
Egypt -0.18 -0.66 0.2 1.5 3.9 
Hungary 0.82 0.82 0.9 6.1 6 
India -0.19 -0.96 0.8 1.2 3.3 
Indonesia -0.70 -1.71 0.6 1.1 0.9 
Ireland 1.61 1.15 1.1 5.4 4.3 
Israel 0.70 -1.25 1.3 6.1 7.3 
Malaysia 0.73 0.29 0.7 2.2 8 
Mexico 0.03 -0.13 0.4 2.9 5.8 
Pakistan -0.68 -1.46 0.2 0.7 2 
Peru -0.46 -0.86 0.1 2.1 3 
Philippines -0.08 -0.98 0.6 1.4 3.2 
Poland 0.60 0.45 0.6 4.5 5.8 
Romania -0.23 0.09 0.4 3.8 3.6 
Russia -0.51 -0.81 1.3 5.3 3.7 
Saudi Arabia -0.12 -0.38 0.5 3 5.8 
Slovenia 0.92 1.01 1.5 6.7 6 
Spain 1.37 0.44 1.1 5.5 4.5 
Thailand 0.25 -0.09 0.2 2 4.2 
Tunisia 0.61 0.23 0.6 2.5 8.1 
Turkey -0.19 -0.85 0.7 5.4 3.7 
Venezuela -0.88 -1.13 0.3 2 4.5 
Viet Nam -0.21 0.29 1 1.5 1.8 
Albania -0.69 -0.47 Na 2.7 5 
Algeria -1.61 -0.53 Na 3.3 5 
Botswana 0.78 0.81 Na 3.3 6 
Croatia 0.30 0.28 1.1 6.5 4.5 
Ecuador -0.95 -0.92 0.1 2 3 
Estonia 0.83 0.98 0.8 4.1 5.7 
Korea S. 0.32 0.90 2.6 2.8 4.6 
Latvia 0.81 0.61 0.4 3.3 5.4 
Lithuania 0.80 0.69 0.7 5 5.2 
Singapore 1.12 2.28 2.2 1.6 3 
Slovak Republic 0.72 0.60 0.6 5.2 4.4 
South Africa -0.25 0.65 0.8 3.2 5.4 
Taiwan 0.57 1.15 Na na Na 
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 The variables reported in this table are strictly connected with variables found relevant for growth in Emerging 
economies (OLS model). In fact, Public expenditure for health is crucial for life expectancy growth and infant mortality 
reduction; Public expenditure for Education is important for net enrolment in secondary school; R&D affects 
competitiveness of firms and therefore exports ability.   
  
TABLE A.4 Comparing Socio-economic models with Poverty, inequality HDI, and GDP,  
plus indicators of legality.  
Countries 
 
Socio-economic  
model  
Poverty Gini index 
(0-100) 
Hdi  
2003 
GDP $ PPP 
2004 
Rule of law 
 
Control of  
Corruption 
Ireland  16** 34 0.946 34551,14 -0.53 -0.52 
Argentina 7*** 53 0.863 12240,14 -0.61 -0.79 
Bolivia  62* 60 0.687 2585,433 -0.32 -0.08 
Bulgaria  12* 29 0.808 7355,352 -0.12 -0.11 
Chile  17* 57 0.854 10146,46 1.20 1.39 
Czech Rep. 5** 25 0.874 15549,08 -0.40 -0.51 
Mexico  20* 49 0.814 9222,413 1.37 1.52 
Peru  49* 45 0.762 5163,547 -0.78 -0.40 
Poland  8** 34 0.858 11000,4 0.64 0.37 
Romania  21* 31 0.792 6944,597 0.03 -0.34 
Albania  25* 28 0.780 5404,704 0.76 0.63 
Botswana  23*** 63 0.565 11409,680 0.05 -0.36 
Ecuador  46* 43 0.759 4316,166 -0.92 -1.02 
Estonia  12.4** 36 0.853 16414,034 1.62 1.60 
Slovak 7** 26 0.849 16040,740 0.83 0.92 
South Africa 
1 
Competitive  
Capitalism 
11*** 58 0.658 12160,622 0.49 0.29 
Taiwan   na Na 20590,490 
-0.40 -0.32 
Korea S. 2*** 31 0.916 27721,088 -0.77 -0.92 
Hong Kong  Na 43 0.927 27763,59 
-0.63 -0.32 
Singapore  Na 42 0.907 28368,110 -0.60 -0.54 
Slovenia  8* 28 0.904 18520,92 0.46 0.32 
Spain  14** 34 0.928 22886,94 -0.26 -0.33 
Thailand  13* 42 0.778 6972,131 -0.88 -0.87 
Lithuania  17**** 36 0.852 14158,421 0.28 0.24 
Latvia  28**** 37 0.836 12666,093 0.87 0.97 
Egypt  16 34 0.659 3816,987 1.18 1.46 
Hungary  7** 27 0.862 14105,46 0.12 -0.31 
Indonesia  27* 37 0.697 3749,541 0.23 0.36 
Philippines  36* 46 0.758 4271,315 -0.02 -0.25 
Malaysia  15* 49 0.796 9545,584 -1.12 -0.95 
Croatia  
2 
Corporative 
capitalism 
Na 29 0.841 12324,796 -0.55 -0.75 
India  28* 32 0.602 2744,918 -0.47 -0.76 
Brazil  22* 58 0.792 7698,284 -0.53 -0.61 
Algeria  22* 35 0.722 7189,246 0.81 0.95 
Turkey  27* 44 0.750 458994,4 0.28 0.07 
Venezuela  31* 44 0.772 5485,154 -0.92 -0.90 
Russia  30* 40 0.795 8587,343 0.98 0.79 
Saudi Arabia Na Na 0.603 13349,96 0.90 0.31 
Tunisia  7* 40 0.753 6981,686 0.61 0.19 
Pakistan  32* 31 0.527 2209,092 0.69 0.29 
Israel  15** 39 0.915 21509,14 2.28 2.37 
Colombia  
3 
Dirigiste  
economies 
64* 59 0.785 6509,121 0.60 0.32 
China  4* 45 0.755 5312,516 0.65 0.42 
Viet Nam  
4 Socialist  
markets 28* 37 0.704 2407,978 1.15 0.65 
Source: UNDP, 2006. Columns Rule of Law and Control of Corruption: Kaufmann et al., 2006 
Data on Poverty refers to the most recent year between 1990-2003: 
*= below national income poverty line  
=**below income poverty line as 50% of national median income 
=*** below $1 a day 
=**** below $4 a day 
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